Between Existentialism and Anti-Existentialism

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Submitted: 2024-11-11; Published: 2024-11-11

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Abstract

The article is an evaluation of Pollock’s anti-existentialist argument and its place in the contemporary debates about Existentialism. We demonstrate that the main contemporary objections to Pollock’s Anti-Existentialism can be grouped into two argumentative directions: (1) Pollock’s supposed confusion of inner and outer truth (Fine, Speaks); (2) Pollock’s assumption that there is such state of affairs as Socrates’s not existing (Kroon). We also introduce an argument against Pollock`s crucial argumentative step against existentialism.