

## REIMAGINING COUNTERSTRUGGLE AS A COMPREHENSIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION: DIMENSIONS AND FACTORS OF STRUGGLE AND RESISTANCE

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### Abstract

This article analyzes strategic issues related to political factors of counterstruggle, which manifest different dimensions of confrontation, counteraction, opposition and resistance. This stimulates the development of innovative solutions that are actively used by political actors to analyze the economic, social, political situation in countries and regions with transitional political and economic systems, as well as to prepare public opinion for making important political decisions. In this context, political assets can quickly transform into liabilities, and ignored liabilities can become invaluable assets. Existing conceptual frameworks for policymaking fail to effectively address the enormous uncertainty inherent in environmental assessment, especially the complexity of constant, gradual change. The counterstruggle framework offers a more effective approach, mitigating the oversimplifications often found in geopolitical analysis. This framework builds on the trifunctional hypothesis, emphasizing compensatory capacities and the need for a balance between all factors to achieve a given goal. This article analyzes the interplay of space, time, and force within counterstruggle that gives rise to trifunctionality. This provides insight into the adaptive capacity available to navigate uncertainty and change, ultimately contributing to the stability that states and societies seek. The relationship between politics and economics goes far beyond our usual perception, in an inverse correlation influenced by the multiplicative effect of counterstruggle factors. In situations marked by uncertainty, the ability to quickly assess and adapt to the current environment becomes paramount, opening up numerous underappreciated methods of policy research.

**Keywords:** conception, conceptual framework, thinking tool, confrontation, counterstruggle, counteraction, opposition, resistance.

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## Introduction

Determined by political counterstruggle (protivoborstvo)\*, experience and interests of political subjects, political sciences at the same time develop according to their own laws, that is, they possess relative independence and internal logic of their development. At the present stage, the development of political science arises on the basis of the previous stage, which was accumulated earlier, at previous stages. Continuity in political science is the fact that in reality itself there is a progressive development of objects and phenomena, caused by their inherent contradictions.

A. Einstein and L. Infeld described this process very figuratively: "Creating a new theory is not like destroying an old barn and erecting a skyscraper in its place. It is rather like climbing a mountain, gaining new and wider views, discovering unexpected connections between our starting points and its rich environment. But the point from which we started out still exists and can be seen, although it appears smaller and forms a tiny part of our broad view gained by the mastery of the obstacles on our adventurous way up." (Einstein and Infeld 1938).

Novaculum Nominalium or Occam's Razor is a double-edged weapon. In politics, it is particularly sensitive because of the unforeseen consequences that arise. In pursuit of a simple formula of happiness or a concept understandable to all, especially with the wrong thinking tool, there is always a huge risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The dogmatic nature of this weapon, which in unskilful hands or unstrengthened minds can cut off not only everything unnecessary, is beyond doubt (Thorburn 1918, 352). However, in order not to turn a sound rule of methodology into a metaphysical dogma, as sometimes happens with Occam's Razor, it is necessary to build the conception not on a myth, but on a thinking tool. Moreover, here it is important to realize that the phrase "Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem" does not mean primitivism. Simply unjustifiably cutting something off with Occam's razor can destroy the foundation of advanced thought or the basis for analyzing a political situation. Curiosity, the precursor to the beginning of creative thinking and the innovative process, is the multiplication of entities. In addition, later on, when you have to give up some previous experience, when you move to a qualitatively new level, it does not seriously damage creative thinking, because the cognition of a multiplicity of entities can be useful in something else. Jakob Burckhardt warned of the lack of benefit of violent simplification of a picture of the world, which logically must yield to a still more violent one. He believed that we should avoid simplifications because "one abstraction made way for a second, still greater abstraction." "In the end, people become exceedingly sensitive to any differentiation; the simplification and standardization secured by the great State suffice no longer." (Burckhardt 1950, 95, 116).

The conception of geopolitics is a typical victim of Occam's razor, and its simplicity hides its primitivism. The basis of any conception is the thinking tool with which it is developed. For geopolitics, this tool was territorial space. The conception of

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
\* In this article, the concept of 'Counterstruggle' (Protivoborstvo) also includes 'Confrontation', 'Counteraction', 'Opposition' and 'Resistance', since this concept means a struggle against someone or something, resistance to someone or something.

geopolitics is based on space, not even in its diversity, as it could be presented by the science of the 20th century. In such a conception, relying on only one-factor leads to the fact that there are no compensatory factors at all. This leads to difficulty in achieving balance when it becomes necessary. It is the strategies based on such a conception that quite often lead to one-sided development of the state, where the balance is imperceptibly disturbed when the environment changes. For example, we know from history that any empire always takes as a basis the conception of geopolitics, i.e. expansion of territorial space. However, all empires sooner or later begin to disintegrate or its territorial space shrinks over time as resources and the ability to hold territories diminish. This shows that without taking into account other factors such as time and force, the conception of geopolitics does not give a balanced action.

In contrast to the conception of geopolitics, the conception of counterstruggle is based on three basic factors. In fact, it's working tools are three factors that require constant balancing. The flexibility of the conception lies in the fact that each factor is compensatory for the other two. In three factors - space, time and force - space is the primary factor, but not the key factor and not more important than the other two.

What is counterstruggle? Counterstruggle (protivoborstvo) is a struggle against someone or something, resistance to someone or something (Efremova 2001). Quarrel, conflict, battle, war all this is counterstruggle, and this state in man is inherent in nature. T. Hobbes in chapter XIII of Leviathan states that principal causes of quarrel are hidden in the nature of man. "For war, consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time, is to be considered in the nature of war." (Hobbes 1998, 83-84). Hobbes's war includes various forms of struggle or resistance, i.e. actually extended counterstruggle, and time is a critical factor in any struggle. Counterstruggle appears where there is a rigid form of conflict, an increase in the number of conflicts and an exit from the comfort zone (see Figure 1).

*Figure 1. Different levels and dimensions of counterstruggle*



Therefore, counterstruggle generating harsh conflict gives impetus to investment in modern technologies, increase and aggravation of conflicts and disturbance of balance gives impetus to acceleration of progress and new technologies, people getting out of their comfort zone gives very strong development of personality in conditions of such conflict, which leads to emergence of outstanding personalities and heroes.

These profoundly transformative conflicts, which are the cornerstone of our coexistence, lead to uncertainty, which translates into uncertainty and fear in decision-making. Napoleon remarked on the point that generals were rarely in a hurry to give battle: "They were well into their positions, entrenched, thinking about their combinations; but there began their indecision; and nothing is more difficult, and yet more precious, than to know how to make up one's mind." (Emmanuel 2021). These feelings of uncertainty and fear in decision-making force us into a mode of short-term crisis management - to the detriment of long-term strategic and sustainable solutions. This reactive approach gives the adversary an advantage if he is better able to assess the constantly changing environment and adjust strategic decision-making to preempt our tactical decisions driven by short-term management. Prussian Field-Marshal Moltke gave very valuable advice on how to act under conditions of uncertainty: "The main point in a series of genuinely special cases is to perceive the situation hidden in the fog of uncertainty, correctly to estimate what is known, to deduce what is unknown, to arrive at a quick decision, and to carry it out powerfully and consistently." (Moltke 1993, 92-93). This advice provides an understanding of where the sources of errors in decision making are hidden and the main ones arise in cognition of the factual situation, in assessing the given, in determining the unknown and in executing the decision. In the process of struggle, managers make mistakes on all these points.

In confrontation, constantly emerging problems require ever new methods of action, the use of ever new means, so that it is always possible to adhere to a single strategic goal and a balance of counterstruggle factors. Fulfilling this requirement is not easy, as the complex environment in some managers reduces mental flexibility and paralyses the will. This stems from the fact that formulaic solutions do not work and one-sided thinking closes the way to alternatives. To break this vicious circle, we need a paradigm shift. The conception of counterstruggle helps to restore mental flexibility and commitment to proactive action. It is not a template, but a thinking tool for each specific case, the application of which requires first a careful weighing of factors and after balancing them.

### **A thinking tool of the conception**

Thinking tools are one of the key pillars of counterstruggle conception design. What is a thinking tool?

Imagine that you are standing in a field and you do not see that the earth is round. However, having seen in the field that the earth is flat, you no longer think that way today because you have a thinking tool that gives you the ability to think differently. Your thinking comes from knowledge of astronomy (celestial bodies have the shape of a ball) and physics (gravity or Newton's law of universal gravitation). Therefore, without seeing the curvature of the earth, you as a thinking tool apply not only what

you see, but also the experience of knowledge. This is how we have manifested a globe where we can all see and study our planet. There are also geographical and topographical maps that give you orientation on the ground. A map is also a tool, but it is already a different thinking tool. With a map, a person has a completely different thinking, because orientation on the terrain with and without a map gives completely different results. Moreover, with each new use of a map, a person starts to think faster and more creatively, because he has a new tool, on the basis of which new experience and new knowledge appear, and accordingly his thinking changes.

One of the thinking tools within the conception of counterstruggle is the tripartite scheme for constructing ideologies, conceptions and social structures. Since ancient times, the tripartite or trifunctional model of any social system or structure has been considered the most harmonious in Indo-European culture: “the tripartite ideology constituted a consistent but flexible system...There are reasons for believing that the tripartite ideology, though elaborated during the common period, had driven out or radically reinterpreted equally venerable conceptions.” (Eliade 1981, 195). Despite the different ways of thinking of the Indo-Europeans, “the general structure of the Indo-European ideology...informs us concerning the type of religious experience and speculation peculiar to the Indo-Europeans. It allows us, furthermore, to appreciate the particular creativity of each of the Aryanspeaking peoples.” (Eliade 1981, 194).

The tripartite social division represents the theory of three social functions and their corresponding ideologies as a phenomenon connected with the real process of social life and social relations. This phenomenon with each new and important stage in the life of society only emphasizes the fundamentality of the tripartite structure in the development of Indo-European society and its ideological attitudes. The universality of the trifunctional theory is the result of social realities, since “division into three by function” is a necessary stage in the evolution of any ideology, especially social ideology. The main point is that this model emerged or re-emerged just when it seemed to suit the development of western European society (Goff 1992, 256-257). This universality is also evident in the use of tripartite structures in contemporary rhetoric and political discourse: *veni, vidi, vici*; liberty, equality, fraternity; signed, sealed, and delivered; father, son, and Holy Spirit; Tom, Dick, and Harry; the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth; this, that, and the other. For these tripartite structures, as can be seen, are characterized by rhythmicity, a certain sequence, alternation of intonation, which allows the speaker to demonstrate systematicity, structural integrity, as well as to present community and unity with the listeners. Tripartite is the most rational social structure for human beings. Such constructions are a characteristic feature of political discourse, because through them they give an assessment of political subjects or phenomena, encouraging their target audience to approval or action (Atkinson 1984, 57-60). Here are prime examples of this (Crystal 2018, 378):

- Mark Antony (The first line of a speech in the play *Julius Caesar*, by William Shakespeare): *Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears.*
- Abraham Lincoln (From Gettysburg Address): *Government of the people, by the people, for the people.*
- Winston Churchill (From the traditional speech of the Prime Minister at the Lord Mayor’s banquet at Mansion House on November 10, 1942): *This is not*

*the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is perhaps the end of the beginning.*

The construction of trifunctionality is a place of confluence of thought and language, because the ternarity is expressed in a certain form, a certain manner of thinking, of speaking the world, a certain way of putting man's action on the world (Duby 1980, 6). The trifunctional theory is the consciously making choices of the human mind among its latent riches (Dumézil 1986, 210). "Thirty or forty successive generations have imagined social perfection in the form of trifunctionality. This mental representation has withstood all the pressures of history. It is a structure." (Duby 1980, 5). This is what can explain the strength of such a design.

The structure (framework) of the conception should be based on a trifunctional model, where its three parts are internally connected, interdependent and require thinking in action. With the correct understanding of each part, the entire historical future sustainability of the state is linked. Take, for example, the conception of ratio status (raison d'Etat, ragion di stato, reason of state), found as early as in ancient writings as the Ciceronian 'ratio publicae'. However, as a political conception it was really introduced to us by Giovanni Botero. Already in its definition he presented it in the form of a trifunctional model. Botero in his treatise gave 'ragion di stato' such a definition: "Reason of state is knowledge of the means suitable to found, conserve, and expand dominion." (Botero 2017, 4). Thus, he declared the foundation, conservation, and expansion of dominion as the three parts of the conception. However, he believes, one of the functions of the conception, namely conservation, still designates more than the other two (Botero 2017, 4). Therefore, he understood the conception of reason of state as a justification of the sense or rationality of conservation of the sustainability of the state in the conditions of chaos and constant struggle for dominion.

Armand Jean du Plessis, known to us as Cardinal Richelieu, took Botero's function of conservation as a basis and derived a new trifunctionality for the conception of the raison d'Etat. In the midst of chaos, religious strife, and struggle for dominion, a way had to be found to conserve the state by giving this conservation meaning. Richelieu understood the conception of raison d'Etat not as the defence of national interest, but as the search for meaning in the conservation of the state and delivering it to each person. Richelieu saw the destruction of Christian society due to the lack of unity among Christians. Changing the nation's perception of time and space in a new way binds together human solidarity, itself and the process of its perception in space and time (Anderson, 2016). He realized that the conservation of state and society was not practicable without imagination creating a new collective tie. To exist at all, all communities must be imagined (Fields 1995, xxxiii). The value character of this connection for the state and for society lies in their convergence in moral and value unification in a manner similar to Durkheim's "one single moral community" (Durkheim 1995, 44). He therefore sanctioned two systems of morality - one for the individual and one for the state - thus completely secularizing the conception of reason of state, stripping it of all moral and religious considerations<sup>\*\*</sup>. He no longer saw God as a compromise figure in the Christian and religious state, since everyone believed

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<sup>\*\*</sup> Catholic France sided with the Protestants in the Thirty Years' War.

that only they were allowed to speak in God's name. At the same time, he saw that, after numerous attempts and assassinations of French kings by religious fanatics, the Botero prince-state axis was no longer working, but was only destroying the state. The state, unlike the king, is not a closed system, but a constantly expanding and changing system. Man, too, is in essence an open system and just as expanding and changing. Since the prince-state axis was losing strength and even in Botero was unclear (Botero 2017, note 1), Richelieu favoured the man-state axis. He realized that the forces of chaos and struggle within the state could not be stopped or completely ceased, but that they could be harnessed. Only two ways of implementation were possible at the time: to make the state more organized, thereby reducing the chaos within it, or to take the chaos within the state to the outside. These two ways reduced entropy and allowed for less policy uncertainty. Richelieu, having suppressed internal enemies, made the state more organized to suppress external enemies and threats. Guided by political necessity rather than moral principles, he gave concrete meaning to the reason of state for France. What led Richelieu to this conception of *raison d'Etat* was his observation of French political life and the chaos it produced. Thus, Richelieu observed that while the political nature of the state has a tendency to maximize entropy, the individual is attuned to maximize its reduction. His conception of *raison d'Etat* therefore sought to strike a clear balance between human aspirations and the political processes that were natural in nature.

In Richelieu's conception of the *raison d'Etat*, the meaning of conservation of the state is in the axis of man-state, not prince-state or nation-state. However, he adds a third functional part to the man-state axis - mortality - linking it to his new morality. The 'art of dying' is a moral lesson of renunciation to all who live, for 'Mourir, c'est prêcher un peu'\*\*\* (Duby 1984, 244). Richelieu explains that the salvation of a man who has an immortal soul occurs ultimately in the next world and so it is not surprising that he should answer before the judgement of God there, while the state is mortal because it has no life in the next world but only in this one. The salvation of the state is either in the present or nonexistent. Consequently, upon the salvation of the state, the human being must be responsible for its conservation immediately in this world as well. The punishments that are necessary for the survival of the state may not be postponed (Richelieu 1858, 195; Rehman 2019, 47). Richelieu's main message is that if the state is not salvaged today, it will no longer exist tomorrow. It should be understood that the third function in the trifunctional model of Richelieu's conception is the most complex. Richelieu, by including mortality in the axis of man-state created the expected imbalance, which creates a tough competition in the choice of human actions, and at the same time created the very compensatory opportunities, which were lacking for the realization of internal political balance.

Another thinking tool in the conception of counterstruggle is the existence of compensation opportunities. Any conception should take into account that the state is like a living organism and its policies should respond to any changes in the internal and external environment. The state always has strengths and weaknesses, so the management process supports the weaknesses at the expense of the strengths. In the

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\*\*\* To die is to preach a bit.

conception of counterstruggle with the help of controlling three factors it is possible to understand what are the strengths and weaknesses. However, it is not always possible to improve the weaknesses to the level we want. Therefore, we need to work on compensatory capabilities. Just as a blind person has compensatory capacities when their hearing and tactile senses are enhanced.

Practically any conception or system of views should have compensation mechanisms that ensure adaptation of the state, all its governing bodies and the system of power as a whole to changing conditions of the environment (changes in the world and regions, changes in the policies of partner states, impacts of negative factors, etc.). However, compensation cannot be long lasting, because, as a rule, it leads to the fact that work with a higher load becomes the cause of weakening of the parameters of the strong factor and causes vulnerability of the system as a whole. The weakened state of the parameters of the strong factor can cause deterioration, due to exceeding the compensation opportunities, of any balanced system. It is also necessary to take into account that in the process of compensation there arise besides real, also ephemeral threats, on which forces can be diverted. Unfortunately, the defence mechanism in the form of compensation of lacks of a weak factor reacts to real and ephemeral problems in the same way. Such errors are possible because of constant rivalry and competition, where not only deception is used, but constant misleading of one's adversary or competitor. This is an integral part and primary goal of any counterstruggle, which includes hybrid warfare.

Compensation or compensation opportunities allow the system to adapt in conditions of abrupt changes in the environment and to adjust to the emerging negative consequences. The balance of the system formed in this way sooner or later ends with the depletion of functional capabilities of the strong factor. The solution of this problem depends on the possibilities of strengthening the parameters of the weak factor in the process of such adaptation and the level of depletion of the source that consumes the weak factor.

If we consider the normal state of the state in a normal external environment as an equilibrium, then the impact of external and internal factors takes the state or some of its governing bodies out of equilibrium, and compensation mechanisms restore equilibrium by making certain changes in the work of governing bodies or changing them. Let us imagine such a situation. Existing flaws in domestic policy activate the discontent of citizens, putting a constant significant burden on law enforcement agencies. Solving this problem only with the use of compensatory possibilities leads to hypertrophy of governing bodies. In this case, the suppression of citizen discontent by law enforcement agencies compensates for the disorganization of governance, but increases the burden on them, creating a new threat. Such a temporary solution to the problem can only buy time to solve the problem, but cannot be considered acceptable. Temporary, because compensation does not balance the qualitative side of the problem, much less its subjective side. Unacceptable because it continues to upset the equilibrium.

Another thinking tool in the conception of counterstruggle is the maintenance of equilibrium (balance) of all factors in accordance with a certain goal. Equilibrium or balance is the state of an equilibrium system, the impact on which is compensated or



absent at all. For any conception, sustainability, and most importantly, increasing sustainability, is very important for understanding what is required for the state and society to fulfil its interests. The vulnerability of the state and society is nothing but the vulnerability of their interests.

Hybrid threats, for example, affect different sectors of society in different ways and to different degrees. Threats per se are not as dangerous as vulnerability, where the impact of force can be directed without proper counterbalancing by another force. If state policy does not aim to counter hybrid threats in the most vulnerable sectors, the equilibrium in society becomes unstable. Critical infrastructure, the economy and the military have many vulnerabilities that reduce resilience. State policies are forced to engage in issues of resilience building, which makes vulnerabilities an obvious argument in any competition to face the rival.

Herbert Spencer believed that the conflict of forces not in equilibrium results in rhythm. Rhythm is the excess of forces in one direction, which is not constant, because “every further transfer through space must alter the ratio between the forces concerned—must increase or decrease the predominance of one force over the other—must prevent uniformity of movement” (Spencer 1862, 317). The rhythm in politics is the rhythm of struggle. Everything strives for equilibrium, but it is constantly disturbed by the counteraction of an opposite force. In politics, all forces are in motion, so balanced motion is more important than static equilibrium.

### **Basic idea of conception of counterstruggle**

Politics and economy interact and collide among themselves much wider than our usual perception. Their interrelationship is the interaction of various forces both within and between societies. However, because of the complexity of analyzing the relationship between politics and economy, in political economy the analysis is usually simplified to the relationship between state and market or power and wealth. Analyzing the relationship between state and market or power and wealth attempts to solve narrowly focused problems. This leaves out of consideration the problem that forms the basis of any rivalry - how to overcome the opponent's force and/or impose one's will on it. The solution to this problem is embedded in the complex relationship between politics and economy. To understand this we need to define what is the relationship between politics and economy? This ratio indicates their common interrelated managerial nature of decision-making affecting people's livelihoods. Such a correlation has an inverse relationship. So, for example, what will be the cost of the tombstone of a deceased family member is determined depending on family policy, since it is impossible to return these costs, let alone make a profit from it. In fact, family policy decides how to allocate economic resources in such cases. Also, most state expenditures for political purposes cannot be recovered economically. And such vivid examples, can be military, cultural and grant aid expenditures. From this we can conclude that the relationship between politics and economy is rooted in their inverse relationship.

Therefore, taking the relationship between politics and economy as a basis, we will assume that the existing strong dependence between politics and economy will always

be inverse. That is, if something is gained in politics, something is diminished in economy and vice versa. We also recognize that neither politics nor economy can exist in a pure form, as policy impacts or economic changes occur over time and under different circumstances.

Such an inverse dependence when modelling their actions political actors should take into account the following: when trying to achieve a certain result in politics, it is necessary to find some economic result that must be sacrificed. And vice versa, if one is trying to achieve economic success, one should look for where to concede in the political sphere. However, we notice that a number of countries are strong both economically and politically. And the concessions and losses, although they appear, remain unnoticed or do not affect at the moment. We will try to give our explanation for this.

We know that the inverse relationship is expressed by the formula  $P = \frac{k}{Ec}$  or  $Ec = \frac{k}{P}$ , where  $P$  is the policy,  $Ec$  is the economy, and  $k$  is the coefficient. This formula means that an increase in one parameter leads to a decrease in the other parameter as much and vice versa. However, in the real ratio of politics and economy everything is not so simple, because there is also a qualitative component of the coefficient. Since the coefficient in the numerator adjusts the result, which is closer or further away from zero. If we plot the graph, we see that with a coefficient less than 1, the curve lies closer to 0. This means aggravation, i.e. more loss with less gain, but when the coefficient is above 1, the curve lies further away from 0. This means that the situation is far from crisis. And the more quantitatively and qualitatively the coefficient is greater, the further the curve is from 0. This indicates that having such a powerful coefficient it is possible to level out most of the losses in the struggle to achieve one's goal.

It is the coefficient in this relationship that makes the situation favourable for a policy in the struggle to achieve its objective or, conversely, aggravating. The coefficient includes factors that react directly or indirectly with each change, and not always linearly. It follows that the relationship between politics and economy is in a state of functional dependence, in which an increase in a certain quantity in politics (e.g. armaments) causes a proportional decrease in a dependent quantity in economy (e.g. investment in infrastructure) and vice versa. However, this increase or decrease cannot be linear, as it is complex in structure. If the coefficient of the state is powerful enough, the decrease may not even occur for a long time.

Such a powerful factor is the counterstruggle factors, which


- their influence is not immediately apparent;
- include elements that are mathematically difficult to calculate;
- include opportunities to achieve a political goal.

This is where the problem arises. How to understand that factors are not immediately apparent and are very difficult to see, but they offer opportunities to achieve a policy goal. The lack of seeing opportunities is related to a common cognitive distortion called survivorship bias: we know all the data from survivors, but we don't have any data from non-survivors. We have to improve on what we have little knowledge of and insufficient data about. Our wrong predictions and wrong decisions lead to an inability to see opportunities that are rare and time-limited. Not to see any data and at the same time to see many data is a major asymmetry that allows us to learn

to see the underlying problems. H. G. Gadamer argued that “... that the important thing is the knowledge that one does not know. Hence the Socratic dialectic-which leads, through its art of confusing the interlocutor, to this knowledge-creates the conditions for the question. All questioning and desire to know presuppose a knowledge that one does not know; so much so, indeed, that a particular lack of knowledge leads to a particular question.” (Gadamer 2013, 374). Overestimating the available data and underestimating the data that is not directly observable increases asymmetry, distorting thinking. The availability of vast amounts of information is like deception; it can distort the thinking of almost anyone and cause them to make the wrong decision. George Box, a prominent statistician of the 20th century, observed: “Just as the ability to devise simple but evocative models is the signature of the great scientist so overelaboration and overparameterisation is often the mark of mediocrity” (Box 1976, 792).

In a broad sense, counterstruggle, like war, affects people both physically and psychologically. Throughout history, counterstruggle has been involved in the creation of human societies, even when armed struggle and physical violence were absent. Competition, resistance, fighting and the desire to be first have psychologically changed both individuals and the whole society. Continuity of counterstruggle gave people the main thing, the ability to think quickly and creatively. Thus accelerate the process of development of economic and political institutions and culture. And this is true both for those who suffered physically and for those who did not suffer at all, because ‘these experiences have a compelling universality, and that one would indeed have to be blind to the world’s course if one wished not to have these experiences’ (Adorno 2001, 104). Moreover, the point is that psychology, or thinkability, makes all the difference in how people react to war and in the kinds of formal institutions they build in its wake’ (Henrich 2021, 338). Counterstruggle is a creative movement through constant struggle, which is also accompanied by resistance. This struggle appears in various forms (see Figure 2). Each form of struggle is an interaction of the will and characters of the opposing parties.

*Figure 2. Typology and spheres of Counterstruggle*



In modern conditions, counterstruggle is very often expressed through the word 'war' - although the use of this word by different authors may have different meanings. For example, cold war, hybrid war, sanctions war, economic war, etc. These word combinations are nothing but the designation of counterstruggle using the word 'war'.

Counterstruggle and war are very similar in meaning, but the semantic meaning does not always reflect the internal dynamics of struggle and resistance that underlie them. It is this internal dynamic that gives them their distinction. Christopher Blattman has observed: "The problem with analyzing wars, however, is that the same things seem to get overlooked again and again, especially the nuanced and complicated strategic logics. Private information was one of these oft-overlooked forces. Another ...is the way that shifting power dynamics make it hard for enemies to commit to a deal." (Blattman 2022). The root of the difference is in the dynamics of the situation. It does not matter what dynamics, positive or negative, it still disturbs the balance, the existing equilibrium. The speed of balance destruction has different consequences and different positions of political actors. Counterstruggle necessarily includes all kinds of struggle and resistance to the full extent, i.e. according to the principle that if you do not use it, your opponent will, but with a certain limitation. The limitation is that the actors try to shift the balance slowly, disturbing the balance insignificantly, so that it is possible to adjust to the change without serious psychological shocks and without material losses and destruction. War also includes all kinds of struggle and resistance, but it breaks all the restrictions to which the opponents could limit themselves. Here the shift in balance creates a chasm in the perception of the struggle itself, and above all a psychological one. In contrast to counterstruggle, the psychological rejection of the enemy with the outbreak of war increases the intensity of some types of struggle and greatly reduces others. The transition from the state of counterstruggle to the state of war is made when a situation of impossibility to adjust to the change occurs and one of the parties is neither willing nor able to restore the equilibrium that has been disturbed by the opponent and/or themselves. However, the irrationality of war also includes the fact that the initiator of breaking the balance or shifting the equilibrium is unable to correct the situation or adjust to such drastic changes. Irrationality and orientation to a sharp break of the existing balance is connected with the fact that the human mind is inherently irrational. This was the way of thinking of the 20th century, it is the way it is now. "We no longer believe in the power of reason over life. We feel that life controls reason." (Spengler 2016, 82). This way of thinking is intertwined in specific, historically determined situations. And at some point, a person can no longer think rationally, conceptually, or even consciously because his ego shields him off from his feelings of guilt (Peters 2014, 151).

If we take Ludwig von Rochau's idea of *realpolitik*, it turns out that the starting point of all political knowledge begins with the conclusion that the law of survival of the fittest plays the same role in the life of states as the law of gravitation in the material world. And the main thing here is not only to realize this, but also to draw the right conclusion that the right of the stronger and the real power of the stronger are not equal. Equalizing them in the actions of the state becomes the cause of gross mistakes and serious defeats (Rochau 1859, 1). Most successfully combined the power of the state and the real power of the strong Otto von Bismarck, who for the sake of

preserving peace, was ready to share and bargain this power. «He was famed for his efforts to find negotiated solutions and avoid war. He even avoided exploiting German military victories, in part to lower the odds of a balancing coalition against him» (Blattman 2022, Ch. 5). Bismarck did not wage war primarily as an armed struggle, but as a counterstruggle, including all types of struggle, including military struggle. He successfully applied the counterstruggle theory: the balance was disturbed exactly as long as Germany was able to adjust to the change in advance or, more importantly, to do it before others. He did not take the next step until the state had adjusted to its previous one. In addition, if it failed to adjust, he retreated, sharing and bargaining for the power that his state had failed to master. Thus, he put real power above the right of the strong. His followers, however, not only failed to internalize his methods, but acted contrary to the theory of *realpolitik*, assuring themselves of their adherence to it. The two world wars and even the post-war conflicts are a vivid confirmation of this.

Any established world order is disrupted long before its dismantling is universally accepted. The system of international relations, which was established after the Peace of Westphalia, the Vienna Congress and the Potsdam Conference, was destroyed before the countries that recognized it began to openly fail to fulfil their obligations. That is, according to *realpolitik*, the real power of the centres of power is no longer sufficient to assert the right of the strong.

### **Method of analysis and evaluation of the counterstruggle framework**

People in their life subconsciously analyses and evaluates hundreds of different parameters when making a decision. All these parameters fit into just three factors: space, time and force. Throughout his life, a person analyses and evaluates situations and his environment. He does it constantly, because in his daily life he has to make many decisions all the time. The knowledge, experience, skills and abilities he acquires over time become the basis for his analysis and evaluation before making a decision. However, society likes to discuss and criticize the decisions made. Herewith, few people pay attention to the analysis and evaluation of the situation that precedes these decisions. This is surprising, because it is more important to discuss what leads to a decision.

Methods of analysis and evaluation may have errors. Accordingly, models based on them are not without flaws. 'Models are not, however, without their drawbacks. It is just not possible to assimilate all variables of a complex event such as war. Multifarious factors such as individual attitudes, national will, and the 'fog of war' are outside the realm of contemporary model making' (Konecny 1988, 46-47). To try to account for errors one should understand how one analyses and evaluates on a subconscious level. What parameters and factors help him in this?

So, let's take the case of a person who wants to cross the street in the wrong place, ignoring the rules of the road. Obviously, as any pedestrian, he does not want to be hit by a car. Therefore, he must analyze and evaluate the situation, and predict such a model of behaviour, in which passing cars will not hit him. And this model will consist of relevant parameters that fit into the three factors mentioned above. Firstly, he must analyze the space around him. This space usually includes the following parameters:

the width of the street he wants to cross, determining the distance of the most dangerous section, the distance to the cars that are approaching his crossing point, the presence of obstacles he will not be able to overcome or a policeman nearby. Secondly, an analysis of time with the parameters included there, such as: the time he crossed the street at the dangerous section, the speed of the cars, the time available for contingencies, whether it is dark or light, what time of year it is. Thirdly, analyzing his capabilities, i.e. the power he possesses. Determining here the parameters, it should be taken into account that any person quite often tries to increase his capabilities with the help of improvised means. And this analysis usually includes relevant parameters: physical strength, availability or absence of appropriate means, clothes and shoes, as well as experience and competence, i.e. material and moral strength. There may be more or fewer parameters in the analysis of each factor, depending on the particular situation. Other parameters that the person deems important may also be included. After the analysis, the person begins to evaluate the results of the analysis of parameters and balances the factors, creating a model in his head. Such a model in our case is an anticipation of how a street crossing will be at a given location at a given time. Thus, on the basis of analyzing and assessing the situation, a person before starting to cross the street creates such a model, with the help of which he makes a decision to manage his traffic. How accurate and correct this model will be and how close to success he will be depends on the analysis and assessment of the situation at that time. In fact, any movement first originates in a person's thoughts and only then is realized in the form of concrete actions.

The models and calculations used for this kind of analysis and evaluation become basic to the human being. This is where the concept's analytical tool and its possible uses become visible. The concept, by making improvements in the area of situational analysis and assessment, leads to the development of a political-military simulation that shows the direction for changing the plan based on the strategic objective. Although a new concept may seem to lack a conceptual apparatus everywhere, there is a constant accretion of conceptual apparatus in the process of situation analysis and assessment. Accretion occurs when not only meaningful but also familiar words catch on with experience, and the shortage is felt when such words slip through. But defining concepts and terms - will not stop the scarcity and increment. The thing is, we don't always need to know the definition of a term to know what we are talking about. We just need to be in the same mindset in which specific concepts, terms, and sometimes new or half-forgotten words are used in order to understand. There are many important terms that are difficult to define but that we can still understand and use perfectly well. "This suggests that our understandings of terms are often prior to our definitions of them - and, so, that we don't always need definitions to understand each other." (McGuiggan 2023). Analysis and evaluation in counterstruggle mainly involves working with existing concepts to clarify their meaning in a particular situation, previously absent or unnoticed or undervalued, to bring them into combinations with each other that are less familiar than those already established. Bringing together different and fragmented elements that initially seem poorly compatible with each other can yield less familiar, but not necessarily entirely new, combinations of scenarios.

Counterstruggle is usually existential in nature, i.e. opponents do not trust each other to such an extent that in the struggle and resistance they are ready to take significant risks, make irrational decisions, incur and inflict significant material and moral damage, as well as kill and be killed. The directionality and orientation of counterstruggle in the broad sense implies the active participation of the subject of politics, which sets the foundations and parameters of consciousness, will, feelings to create an impact on some object of confrontation. In fact, counterstruggle is not a single act at all, but a whole synthesis of acts. Any act of counterstruggle directed at an external object must find an interrelated effect on an internal object. Despite the fact that the directing of the act towards the external and towards the internal object is for different purposes, a kind of unity of method is nevertheless crystallized. However, unity does not mean balance or equilibrium, which is intractable and indefinable, since in analyzing and evaluating it is difficult to know where the culminating point is. Therefore, the basis of counterstruggle is the reality given to the human mind, something that is not given to the machine. Reflexion, as the analysis and evaluation of what is happening around us, is formed by addressing the components of reality, studying and comparing them.

Counterstruggle is a constant reflexion, but analyzing and evaluating a huge number of parameters of reality is not possible for human control. Here it is necessary to apply a procedure by means of which the huge number of parameters is reduced to three components (space, time, force) influencing reality, called factors. Each factor combines related parameters that influence the parameters of another factor. The analysis and evaluation of the space, time and force factors are more than suitable for analyzing emerging situations based on the evaluation of the information received.

The ability to make critical and diversified decisions to achieve policy goals begins with analyzing and assessing the factors that need to be balanced. An ancient Indian political treatise, *Arthashastra*, dating from around the first century AD (Rangarajan 1992, 20-21), expressed the wisdom of Indian civilization about the need to balance the factors of power, time and place as they reinforce each other (Olivelle 2013, 350). The ideas of the necessity of balancing factors in the treatise were expressed as follows: space, time, and force contribute one to the other; when one excels in space, time, and force, then proceed to consider something else; if one wishes to win, one should not embark on a campaign without grasping the strength and weakness of both one's own and the enemy's in relation to space, time, and force (Olivelle 2013, 349-52; Rangarajan 1992, 625).

As we can see, the idea of balancing the factors of space, time and force has been known since ancient times. The author of the treatise *Arthashastra* considered force, time and place useful in the performance of any activity (Bisht 2019, 114; Kautilya 1992). It is considered a book of political realism rather than powerless idealism and analyses how the political world works and rarely how it should work and this works better in practice to preserve the state and the common good (Boesche 2002, 17).

Once a political objective has been defined, the factors of space, time and force must be balanced against it. This means that you will need to interrelate these factors in such a way as to enhance your freedom of action and make it more difficult for your opponents. By analyzing and evaluating the factors individually, it is necessary to

understand how you will balance them in combination with the relevant objectives. The most notable example of someone who had the ability to correctly balance the factors of space, time, and force with a given objective was Napoleon I.

Each factor includes a number of parameters, which are the constituent elements of the factor. Also in each factor, the parameters are divided into objective and subjective. In this context, the following most important parameters that require constant monitoring can be identified:

- 1) *Space (one near the other)*: 1.1) Physical (objective) space: Geographic space; Location and maps; Air and outer space; 1.2) Mental (subjective) space: Social space (including media space and cyberspace); Private (personal) space; Linguistic space (language distribution).
- 2) *Time (one after the other)*: 2.1) Quantitative (objective) characteristic (metrized duration): Real time; Speed; Tempo; Time of day; Seasons; Century, epoch; Term; 2.2) Qualitative (subjective) characteristic (non-metrized duration): Temporality; Irreversibility; Continuity; Unidimensionality; Connectedness; Symmetry; Logical time.
- 3) *Force (one changes the other)*: 3.1) Material (objective) forces (military, economic, financial, etc.): Reserves; Armed forces; Armament and military equipment; Technologies; Economic resources; Currency; Human resource; 3.2) Moral (subjective) forces: Ratio of forces; Moral forces; Intellectual forces; Governance (degree of centralisation and decentralisation); Literacy and competence; Mentality.

Parameter analyses should start with quantifiable parameters, i.e. objective parameters. First we analyze the objective parameters of space, then time and only at the end force. After that we proceed to analyze subjective parameters of space, time and force respectively. Subjective parameters occupy a special place in the analysis because they are not quantifiable and are difficult, and sometimes impossible, to estimate with any degree of certainty. These parameters involve so much uncertainty, variability, complexity and lack of precision. Subsequent factor estimation is done by taking into account the parameter analysis followed by balancing the evaluated factors with the goal. Factor evaluation should be done in pairs: space-time, space-force, time-force. The evaluation of factors is carried out in these pair combinations, after which there is an alignment with the strategic goal to be achieved. And when balancing the factors with the goal, space-time-force should go in sequence. However, a significant change in one of the factors will inevitably upset the overall balance and require a reassessment of all factors. This requires periodic monitoring to balance the factors with the goal. Also, any change in the goal will require a rapid reassessment of the relevant factors and their equilibration with the newly defined goal.

The correct evaluation and balancing of space, time and force factors is the most complex process. The following aspects should be emphasized in the success of achieving the balance of space, time and force factors: 1) a correctly set goal; 2) realistic analysis and evaluation of the factors; 3) correct analysis of the key parameters of the factor; 4) maximum freedom of action; 5) filtering the flow of information; 6) formation of one's own agenda; 7) rational decision-making; 8) control of



interrelations of factors in planning; 9) lack of one factor, replace with another; 10) change of one factor disrupts the balance; 11) if you don't have your own balance, destroy your opponent's balance.

### **Conclusion and discussion**

The famous phrase of the Roman politician Cato the Elder 'Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam' symbolizes perseverance and intransigence. This insistence by a politician of the Roman Republic to fight an opponent or obstacle called for the destruction of the foundations of danger. Nowadays, the use of the phrase is used as an implicit reference to the need to destroy the established status quo long before it becomes apparent. In any status quo, there is always a group of countries that did not participate because they remained outside the brackets of the fundamental treaties on world order. As a result, the balance of the post-war world is inevitably destroyed and a situation is created in which the actions of the guarantors of the post-war world can be described in the words of Isocrates 'With those things in which I have skill the time doth not suit; and in those things with which the time suits I have no skill' (Plutarch 1878).

The contemporary political situation reflects the disturbed balance of the post-war world, creating uncertainty for policy makers and an uncertain future world order. In the context of uncertainty, where it is difficult to identify the changing environment, the concept of counterstruggle provides a tool for assessing the situation and subsequent planning at all levels. The constant monitoring and balancing of space, time and force factors is a prerequisite for the conduct of struggle, especially when there is a high degree of uncertainty in the counterstruggle process.

The main problem with forecasting and planning is that people tend to solve those problems that they know how to solve. So they tend to start solving secondary problems instead of the most important ones. Moreover, to be successful, you need to solve the most difficult ones, which are usually the most important problems. Counterstruggle theory allows us to see the basic components that help in solving basic and complex problems. The factors of space time and force through evaluation and calculation help to solve the most important problems and, as a rule, the most difficult ones. In addition, balancing them with a strategic goal makes it possible to escape from constant uncertainty and to implement more sustainable policies and strengthen the economy. This is not a one-off operation, but an ongoing process.

### **Supplementary material**

The supplementary material for this article can be found at <https://doi.org/10.46991/JOPS/2024.3.9.050>

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The author declares no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

### Ethical standards

The author affirms this research did not involve human subjects.

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