

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO POLITICAL STABILITY: HOW DO THEORIES INTERPRET THE FACTORS INFLUENCING IT?

ARMEN MIRZOYAN* 
Yerevan State University

Abstract

Political stability is a crucial concept within political science, yet its theoretical foundations and influencing factors are often dispersed across various perspectives. This article presents the first comprehensive attempt to synthesize and analyze the theoretical approaches to political stability within a single work. Drawing from both political science and sociology, this study aims to explore how political stability shapes and is shaped by political, economic, social, and cultural systems. By examining the reciprocal relationships between these systems and political stability, the article identifies key theoretical frameworks that explain its trends and impacts. Notably, this is the first effort to address these theories in a unified manner, filling a gap in both Armenian political science literature and broader global scholarship. This work contributes to a deeper understanding of the factors that influence political stability and offers insights into their implications for societal development.

Keywords: stability, political system, instability, Influencing factor, modernisation theory, institutionalism, conflict theory, state-centered theory, structural functionalism, rational choice.

Introduction

To understand the trends in political stability within political science, identify the factors influencing it, and examine their subsequent impact, it is essential to explore specific theories in political science and sociology. From various perspectives, these theories can analyze the effects of political stability on the development of political, economic, social, and cultural systems in society and the reciprocal influence of these systems and factors on political stability. This article is unique, as no scientific works in Armenian political science literature or global political science thought examine political stability within the framework of theories commonly found in political science and sociology in one article. This work is the first attempt in this direction and aims to

* **Armen Mirzoyan** is a PhD candidate of the Chair of Political Science at Yerevan State University. He is a Journalist for Hetq.am and Project Manager at “Investigative Journalists” NGO. Email: armen.mirzoyan@ysu.am. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0008-2396-4933>.



identify the theoretical aspects of political stability by applying the critical features of these theories.

In the academic literature, there is an approach that considers political stability as a dependent variable (Goldsmith 1987, 471; Tabassam, Hashmi, and Rehman 2016; Cebula 2011). In other words, it is influenced by various factors and emerges due to their systemic interaction. In this context, Arthur Goldsmith emphasizes that even analysts with radical views share the approach that stability is more of an outcome than a cause.

Studying events that transition the political system from stability to instability involves analyzing their underlying foundations. Political theorists employ various paradigms when exploring the factors that lead to instability. For example, Samuel Huntington argues that instability arises when demands exceed the capabilities of the political system; in other words, a failure to meet the socio-political demands of the population can lead to riots and mass protests (Huntington 1973, 49). In contrast, Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend explain instability in terms of psychological causes, noting that it can result from frustration and perceived deprivation (Feierabend et al. 1966, 256). Douglas Hibbs also used factor analysis techniques to identify social, economic, and political aspects to explore the causes of political instability (Hibbs et al. 1973). Nevertheless, some authors in the academic literature consider political stability as an independent variable and note that it can influence other critical socio-economic processes. Perhaps the most well-known among them is Mancur Olson, an American economist and professor of economics at the University of Maryland, who developed Olson's theory of stability and growth (Olson 1982). In this regard, Goldsmith adds that the primary reason for the lack of research on political stability as an independent variable is that most scientists regard stability as valuable and do not investigate its consequences as thoroughly as they study its causes (Goldsmith 1987, 471). As a second reason, Goldsmith highlights that many theorists assume stability is a valuable tool for economic development. According to him, these theorists are confident that stability is a crucial condition for economic growth and prosperity but do not take the initiative to examine it empirically. As an exception to this approach, Robert Green and William Cunningham highlight the numerous studies on the impact of political stability on foreign investment (Green et al. 1975, 114). The volume of foreign investments is directly proportional to the level of risk, so both the academic community and the private sector are interested in periodically conducting such research. People tend to invest in countries with low political unrest, wars, or other factors threatening investment.

In this article, political stability and the factors influencing it will be examined within the framework of the following theories: Modernization theory; Institutional theory; Conflict theory; State-centered theory; Structural-Functional theory; Rational choice theory. The selection of these theories is based on their close connection to the concept of political stability and their broad range of factors contributing to stability.

Modernization theory

Modernization theory is one of the most widely applied theories in political science. This theory bases its approaches on economic growth and development and examines the social evolution process and societies' development. In brief, the primary approach of Modernization theory suggests that as a state develops and modernizes economically, its political institutions tend to become more democratic. In their book *"Non-Modernization: Power–Culture Trajectories and the Dynamics of Political Institutions,"* Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson define Modernization theory as a cornerstone of contemporary political science. They note that the essence of this theory is that richer, more educated, and economically developed societies or states tend to have more advanced political institutions. These institutions become more democratic, respect basic civil and human rights, and create other socio-political characteristics typical of Western democracies (Acemoglu et al. 2022, 324). Notable theory representatives include Marion J. Levy Jr., Gabriel Almond, Seymour Martin Lipset, Walt Rostow, Daniel Lerner, David Apter, Cyril Edwin Black, Myron Weiner, and Karl Deutsch.

However, the American sociologist and political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset developed the classical approach to the Modernization theory. According to him, democracy directly results from economic growth. In his book *"Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,"* Lipset emphasizes that the more prosperous a nation is, the more likely it is to maintain a democratic order (Lipset 1959, 75). Modernization theory dominated political science during the 1950s and 1960s when liberal democratic approaches and views were actively developing in the Western world after World War II. Two decades after the war, American political scientists and their students, with financial support from public and private institutions, primarily studied economic development issues in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, along with processes and socio-cultural changes related to political stability (Tipps 1973, 200).

In the academic literature, two levels of study of classical modernization theory are distinguished: studies at the microcosmic level, which focus on the constituent elements of social modernization such as urbanization, gender and income inequality, skills acquisition and education, the role of political communication and the media, bureaucratic corruption, etc (Bhambra 2023; Gorelikov 2021). The other level is studies at the macrocosmic level, which focus on empirical trajectories and observable processes of modernization of nations and societies, including their economics and politics (Goorha 2010, 3). Thus, it can be assumed that Modernization theory, when assessing a particular state's political stability or instability, focuses exclusively on socioeconomic and political factors that directly impact the democratic development of that society. In the context of political stability, at the micro level, the focus is on individuals, families, or even companies, whose discontent can lead to societal protests. These protests, in turn, can undermine political stability. In this case, political instability originates from the 'down top'. While, at the macro level, the focus is on systems in general—whether political, economic, or social—and political instability typically originates from the 'top down'. At this level, political theorists and

economists do not develop models for transforming individual sectors of the economy or social systems. Instead, they create universal and comprehensive development theories that, according to proponents, directly lead to the state's and society's modernization.

Within the framework of Modernization theory, political scientists and economists also emphasize Olson's theory of stability and growth. As mentioned earlier, Mancur Olson is one of the economists who consider political stability as an independent variable influencing other critical socioeconomic processes. In his book "The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities," he argues that political stability has a much more complex relationship with economic growth than previously thought. According to Olson, wars, revolutions, and other events that destabilize the political system negatively affect economic activity in the short term. However, he argues that these disruptions create conditions for faster growth in the medium term. However, Olson argues that long-term political stability can lead to slower economic growth (Goldsmith 1987, 472). Olson also presents a reason that, in the long term, leads to decreased economic activity. According to him, political stability can negatively impact the economy due to the mercenary activities of certain powerful interest groups. These groups sometimes hinder society's ability to introduce new technologies and redistribute resources, thereby slowing economic growth (Goldsmith 1987, 472). At the same time, Olson does not explicitly state that chronic political instability contributes to economic growth.

Based on this, Olson identifies four types of political systems:

1. Chronically unstable countries that are expected to experience sustained slow economic growth.
2. Invariable, stable countries are expected to experience relatively rapid economic growth but may see a decline over time.
3. Stabilizing political systems that adapt to new models of political stability and, as a result, are expected to experience sharp economic growth.
4. Regimes that are becoming less stable. Olson does not make specific predictions about these regimes but concludes that their economic growth rates will likely decline sharply (Goldsmith 1987, 472).

Olson developed his classification by studying the experiences of Western countries and Japan, but he believes this approach is also applicable to developing countries. In their works, proponents of Modernization theory have identified political and socio-economic factors that affect political stability. Moreover, some of them have also highlighted extreme political instability as a phenomenon influenced by four factors: 1) Assassinations of high-ranking officials and politicians, 2) Illegal seizure of power, 3) Armed attacks, 4) Deaths resulting from political violence within the state (Bollen et al. 1982, 1077; Torres Jarrín and Daza Aramayo 2023; Agbloyor, Nyeadi, Opperman and Dankwah 2024).

From the perspective of the state or society, all these factors are internal and exclude external causes of instability (such as foreign invasions or wars), which Olson also considers (Goldsmith 1987, 472). The exclusion of external causes of instability is one of the main criticisms of this theory.

Critics of Modernization theory argue that many economically developed countries have political systems that are not free and are, in fact, undemocratic. In the second half of the 20th century, critics of modernization theory almost unanimously cited the Soviet Union as an example. They pointed out that, despite being a significant power with abundant resources and rapidly increasing industrial strength, a totalitarian regime completely eliminated the features inherent in democracy. The example of the Soviet Union challenges the absolute assertion of Modernization theory supporters that as a state develops and modernizes economically, its political institutions become more democratic. Critics have also cited Japan and Germany at various times, noting that industrialization in the initial stages did not lead to establishing a stable democratization process (Treisman 2020, 242). In this regard, a group of experts argues that the opposite approach may be practical: establishing democracy and political stability in a country might more likely lead to economic modernization (Acemoglu et al. 2014, 908). Others argue that economic modernization helps democracies survive but does not necessarily promote democratization (Przeworski et al. 1997, 166).

Critics of modernization theory question whether modernization expands the rights of citizens. China is a primary example cited by critics of Modernization theory in the modern world. According to the World Bank, as of 2023, China is the world's second-largest economy by GDP in absolute value after the United States (The World Bank Group 2024). According to the logic of Modernization theory, political freedoms and the protection of human rights should have expanded in parallel with China's rapid economic growth. However, the situation in China reveals the exact opposite. According to Freedom House's "*Freedom in the World 2024*" report, China is considered a "Not Free" country (Freedom House 2024), with most human rights organizations reporting severe repression of Turkic-speaking Uyghurs (Amnesty International 2021). Additionally, China has become a classic example of a digital dictatorship (Mirzoyan 2023, 66).

Thus, based on the essence of classical Modernization theory, it could be argued that the more economically developed a particular state or society is, the more stable its political system will be. However, having a developed economy or social system alone is insufficient to ensure a country's political stability. One of the most striking examples of this is Israel. Israel has a relatively developed economy and ranks highly in social welfare. Nevertheless, it is among the countries where weekly protests occur, sometimes leading to clashes with the police.

Institutional theory

This theory is also one of the most prevalent theories in political science, focusing on the more profound and more enduring aspects of social structure. It explores the processes and mechanisms by which structures, schemas, rules, norms, and everyday practices become essential guiding principles of social behaviour. The various components of institutional theory explain how these elements are created, distributed, accepted, and adapted over time and space and how they are neutralized, fall out of use, or form the basis for new structures (Ritzer 2005). The theory focuses on the key institutions of the political system, including legislative and executive bodies. In the

context of public policy, institutional theory is the process of policy development itself, specializing in the legal and judicial aspects of public administration in the transformation and change of political regimes and forms of governance (Hédoin 2024; Mazzoleni 2024).

In his article “*Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism*”, Guy Peters presents several approaches to institutionalism (Peters 2019, 28). The first approach to institutional analysis is the normative approach, proposed by James March and Johan Olsen. They argue that the best way to understand individual and collective political behavior is to apply the ‘logic of appropriateness’ people acquire through participation in institutions (March et al. 1998, 951). March and Olsen believe that individuals working in an organization should follow the institution’s normative standards rather than be guided by narrow personal interests (Peters 2011). This means that relative stability can be ensured in a system if the members of a community or society follow the same game rules set for everyone. When examining political stability, normative institutionalism emphasizes how adherence to shared norms and values contributes to the legitimacy and stability of political institutions.

The second approach considers institutionalism from the perspective of rational choice. The basic logic of rational choice institutionalism is that institutions are a set of rules, and members of these institutions behave in accordance with the core components and requirements of the institutional structure (Peters 2011). In this case, institutions provide their members with clear guidelines on political behaviour while also creating an environment in which actors can predict outcomes and make rational choices that contribute to overall stability (Peters 2019, 61). Unlike the previous approach, in this case, people's preferences do not change based on their affiliation with the institution. Rational institutionalism focuses on subjects who make informed choices based on costs and benefits. In the context of political stability, this approach emphasizes the role of institutions in creating incentives and constraints that guide policy choices toward stable and predictable outcomes, thereby ensuring stability in a given society.

As a third approach, Peters identifies historical institutionalism, which holds that the political direction established or chosen at the creation of an institution will have a decisive influence on its policy in the future. In other words, the decisions made at the initial stage set a path that is difficult to deviate from and will, in the long term, have a lasting impact on further policy development (Peters 2019, 80-82). This approach is widely applicable for explaining compliance with a policy or policy course but is less helpful in explaining changes in policy or structure. This highlights the dependence of institutions on their chosen path. According to Peters, past events and decisions shape current institutional mechanisms. According to him, well-established institutions with a long history of legitimacy and effectiveness are often present in modern political systems. He argues that these institutions create an ‘isolation effect’ that can help organizations remain stable during radical changes, but this effect can also undermine stability (Peters 2019, 100). In political stability, historical institutionalism emphasizes the enduring influence of institutional heritage and the importance of adherence to the chosen path (Peters 2019, 80-82).

The following approach is empirical institutionalism. This approach focuses on the systematic observation, measurement, and analysis of political institutions to understand their structure, behaviour, and impact on political stability. Empirical institutionalism is based on empirical evidence and rigorous methodologies for studying how institutions function in practice and how they contribute to maintaining political stability. The empirical analysis allows for assessing how healthy institutions achieve their goals, how public order is maintained, and whether authorities in a given country ensure accountability and transparency in governance. The logic of this approach is that political stability depends on the performance of institutions; thus, lower performance results in a higher risk of political instability. Empirical institutionalism is primarily associated with Samuel Huntington. Huntington stressed the importance of creating structures mediating between the demands of society and state authorities (Huntington 1973, 8-11). According to Huntington, the mediation body also needed to be state-owned. In contrast, Robert D. Putnam argues that civil society can fulfill this intermediary role, contributing to the establishment of a stable and effective democracy (Putnam 1993).

Peters also highlights sociological institutionalism. This approach emphasizes institutions' cultural and cognitive aspects, arguing that they are deeply rooted in social practices and collective identity (Webber 2024; Aidnik 2024). Sociological institutionalism views institutions as social structures created through interactions and shared ideas (Peters 2019, 144-148; Aleksanyan 2020). Based on this, we can assume that cultural norms, shared ideas, and cognitive frameworks influence the stability and functioning of political institutions. This approach emphasizes the socio-cultural aspects of institutions and their role in maintaining political order and stability. Some scholars argue that legitimacy, transparency, and political activity grounded in the norms and values of political culture are crucial for political stability (Samuels 2024; Goldberg 2024).

Conflict theory

Conflict theory is one of the most prominent theories in political science. It emerged in the late 1950s and early 1960s and is based on the approaches and views of Karl Marx (Fornet-Betancourt 2024; Tarrit 2023). This theory views society as a complex system characterized by inequality and competition for limited resources. Classical conflict theory primarily focuses on differences in power, such as class conflict. Classical conflict theory views political stability through power dynamics and the ongoing struggle between different social groups. Political stability often reflects the control of dominant groups over resources (Tusalem 2015, 7). These groups maintain stability to protect their interests and, in addition, exert control over the groups under their authority. According to the classical theory approach, public authorities, especially law enforcement bodies, are seen as tools of the ruling class. The ruling class attempts to maintain political order and suppress any disobedience or unrest by applying laws, policies, and political institutions. Any deviation from these characteristics can lead to political instability. However, modern conflict theorists diverge significantly from classical approaches to the theory. Contemporary proponents of the theory believe that

fundamental conflicts of interest constantly arise in society and that social order is achieved through a balance of forces, where the interests of the powerful restrain and direct the desires and demands of the less powerful (Shi 2022; Beck and Grayot. 2021; Orsini 2024). From the conflict theory perspective, it can be noted that stability resulting from existing inequality is a fragile phenomenon. Economic inequality, social polarisation, and other forms of social stratification create a basis for tension, upheaval, and political instability (Deitelhoff and Schmelzle 2023; Leonardi 2024).

Nevertheless, political instability in such societies, which may be accompanied by mass protests, violent actions, and revolutions, can eventually lead to overthrowing the ruling power and the political regime. Significant political changes are often initiated from below in such societies through protest actions. Some theorists argue that stability in these societies can be partially maintained by fostering false consciousness among subordinate groups (Thompson 2015, 450), compelling them to accept their position in the social hierarchy (Balázs and Molnár 2024; Kortesoja 2023).

In conflict theory, political stability is maintained through force, ideological approaches, and unity based on coercion. Any deviation from these methods can lead to instability in the system. Additionally, political stability can also result from the resolution of these conflicts.

State-centered theory

Unlike the other theories mentioned, the State-centered theory is less common in political science practice. This theory emphasizes the role of government in shaping the social system and civil society, highlighting the exceptional role of the state as a political entity (Sharp 2009, 184). German political scientists, notably Max Weber and Otto Hintze, primarily advanced the claims about the state's central role in political life and politics. Max Weber defines the state as an entity capable of formulating and implementing its goals (Luiz 2000, 228). Based on the Weberian approach to the ideal state, Joel S. Migdal views the state as an organization composed of various bodies managed and coordinated by the executive branch, which has the authority and power to govern people in a specific area (Garzarelli, Keeton and Siteo 2023; Ray, Jain, Thakur and Miglani 2023). John Martinussen adds that the state can be analyzed from several perspectives, including as a platform for conflicts and cooperation and from the standpoint of its independent functioning. The last two statements reflect a state-centered approach, emphasizing the importance of the actual use of the state's tools (Garzarelli, Keeton and Siteo 2023; Ray, Jain, Thakur and Miglani 2023). The theorists of the state-centered approach argue that state structures and actors should have a central influence on politics and political processes.

The logic of state-centered theory is based on the idea that having a strong, centralized government is crucial for ensuring political stability. Moreover, this government must possess high legitimacy. Authorities with high legitimacy, efficient administration, and high operational effectiveness can ensure political stability. In countries with legitimate governments, the probability of political instability is lower. The theory emphasizes the importance of solid governments, public authorities, fragile and institutions in general. It is also crucial for these bodies to implement effective

policies addressing socio-economic issues, maintaining political order, and increasing public confidence in state power. Implementing social welfare programs and providing public goods by public authorities are seen as means to prevent social unrest and discontent while addressing social needs (Cherepanov 2024; Finlay 2024). By meeting the population's needs, the state can mitigate potential sources of discontent and ensure stability. Since the monopoly on the legitimate use of force belongs to the state, ensuring political stability during critical moments requires using this force proportionally to prevent violence.

Structural-functional theory

Structural-functional theory, or structural functionalism, is one of the most well-known theories in political science and sociology, developed by Talcott Parsons. This theory views society as a social system composed of various structures, with each structural element interacting and performing specific functions to maintain the stability and functioning of the system. The key feature of this theory is that all aspects of society—including individuals, institutions, events, and actions—must be interconnected, as only in this way can the society or social system function and survive. According to the theory, society survives by fulfilling its needs, meaning that the system and its parts must interact harmoniously. This harmonious interaction leads to the maintenance of social order (Deitelhoff and Schmelzle 2023; Leonardi 2024). If this order is disrupted, the system's stability is also compromised. To ensure effective interaction and maintain stability within the system, it is essential first to understand the needs of individuals (Bhambhri 1973, 456; Bungraz 2024).

This theory also examines the role of institutions and social behaviour in society. In addition to the social aspect, it also considers the economic interests of the system. The economy cannot function properly if societal issues disrupt interactions within the system.

Parsons divides human actions into two types: logical, based on rationality, and illogical, which may manifest unconsciously through sensory states. In his view, society must address four main problems: adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and maintaining hidden models. By adaptation, Parsons refers to finding and allocating resources within the system. According to him, this is the role of economic actors in society. By integration, Parsons refers to the mechanisms that help maintain the cohesion of society. He criticized theorists who viewed humans as purely rational beings. According to him, people often make irrational choices, particularly in economic activities. According to this American scholar, this is the most crucial factor to consider when studying the social model of society. Unlike conflict theory, Parsons downplays the significance of conflicts, viewing them merely as temporary disruptions within society. This perspective has become one of the main points of criticism against his theory.

Robert Merton also made significant contributions to the development of structural functionalism. Merton's observations on structural functionalism often contrast with Parsons' approaches. While Parsons viewed society as a single, unified system, Merton introduced a perspective that examines society in distinct segments (Merton 1968). The

scholar emphasizes that not all functions necessarily meet the system's needs. According to him, functions can positively or negatively impact the system, with the latter being termed 'dysfunctional'. Unlike Parsons, Merton does not hold an optimistic view of society. Merton argues that the significance of values in society is not absolute, as customs and norms may be functional for some groups within a society but non-functional for other similar groups within the same society (Merton 1968).

As mentioned earlier, according to this theory, society is a complex social system, with one of the goals of the interaction among its elements being the maintenance of social order or stability. When there is harmonious interaction within a society, the state's political stability is ensured. Any factors that affect this chain of interaction can lead to instability. To ensure stability, society coordinates cooperation and communication among its individual elements and interacts with other systems. Most importantly, stability is maintained when individuals' primary and secondary needs are met. The theory posits that political institutions are crucial to ensure stability, as they are primarily responsible for organizing this interaction. Their decisions and laws regulate the parameters within which this interaction occurs. Effective political institutions, through predictable and transparent management, maintain stability in society.

Nevertheless, many theorists criticized structural-functional theory, with the most significant criticism occurring in the mid-20th century. Critics argued that the theory did not adequately address social order and stability factors, such as poverty, economic inequality, or dissent. Some American theorists have also criticized the theory for its near-complete disregard of racial, class, and gender issues. Additionally, one of the most significant criticisms was directed at the theory's subordination of the role of individual personality.

Rational choice theory

The final theory discussed in this article is the theory of Rational choice. This theory helps to understand political, economic, and social behaviour by analyzing how individuals make decisions in specific situations (Oppenheimer 2012). It is widely used across various social sciences and forms the basis for cognitive choice theory in psychology. Rational choice theory posits that people's behaviour should align with their accepted values, and their actions should be based on these values (Oppenheimer 2012). The theory defines 'rationality' as the process by which a person evaluates costs and benefits to take actions that maximize personal gain (Friedman 1953, 21).

The theory's origins are rooted in Thomas Hobbes' book "*Leviathan*". Later, the foundations of the theory were further developed by Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill in their respective works.

The rational choice approach assumes that human behaviour is driven by personal interests, with individuals aiming to maximize benefits or achieve specific personal goals (Petracca 1981, 289). Rational choice theory posits that when making decisions, individuals consider their interests before making a choice. This theory examines political stability through the lens of individual interests. Moreover, political stability can be viewed as the result of individual actions. Political actors, such as voters,

politicians, or interest groups, interact with one another from a strategic perspective, prioritizing their preferences in their actions. The stability of the political system depends on the actions and interactions of key political players, which helps to balance and restrain the ambitions of each player. Since individuals prioritize their interests when making decisions, political stability will be achieved if these interests are satisfied to a degree that is acceptable to them. People can cooperate to achieve their goals through collective action when individual interests align. A stable political system facilitates such cooperation, allowing for the formation of new political and public associations. However, suppose a political system exhibits significant inequality, where a large portion of society cannot access resources available to a smaller, privileged group. In that case, collective actions can lead to political instability. This may give rise to political movements and provoke riots or revolutions, potentially resulting in the collapse of the existing system.

Conclusion and discussion

Thus, a comprehensive study of political stability through the lens of various theories enables a deeper understanding of the multifaceted factors influencing stability and helps develop effective strategies and programs to address and mitigate potential risks. Each theory provides insights into political stability—whether through modernization, conflicts, rational choice, or other approaches—highlighting the diverse elements contributing to or undermining stability. This article presented the first comprehensive attempt to synthesize and analyze the approaches of political stability theories within a single work, offering a unified framework for understanding how these various perspectives intersect and complement one another. This effort aims not only to fill a significant gap in both Armenian and global political science literature but also to pave the way for more cohesive strategies in addressing political stability challenges.

Applying these theories in concert allows for a nuanced analysis of how various factors interact to shape political stability. It also helps in identifying specific vulnerabilities within a political system and crafting targeted interventions. Understanding these dynamics from multiple theoretical angles ensures that strategies and policies are well-rounded and more likely to effectively address the root causes of instability. By exploring these theories together, researchers and policymakers can develop a more comprehensive approach to analyzing political stability, considering both structural and individual factors, as well as potential conflicts and inequalities that may impact the resilience of political systems.

Supplementary material

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Conflict of interests

The author declares no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

Ethical standards

The author affirms this research did not involve human subjects.

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