Abstract

The article studies the behavioral models of parties in democratic change in terms of building coalitions and con-cluding “pacts” within the framework of their own value sys-tem. The party coalitions established as a consequence of Armenia‟s presidential and legislative elections over the past 20 years are analyzed. Since 2003, and to this day, coalitions in Armenia have assumed only the consolidation of political personalities pursuing power and the formation of coalitions with “minimal gain”. The ineffectiveness of the political coa-lition is due to the formal nature of thematic and doctrinal discussions as a result of the absence of genuine communi-cation between the ruling elite. The method is supported by evidence that the inefficiency of coalitions established in Ar-menia during the democratic transition period suggests that coalitions are one of the causes of political growth crises only in terms of maintaining their own interest-based system.With this method, the authors demonstrate the persistence of Armenia‟s political development crises in the context of democracy transition.

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